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National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab-
Will the War Against Drugs Abrogate
Constitutional Guarantees?
I. INTRODUCTION
With the national campaign for a "drug-free America,"' the consti-
tutionality of mandatory drug testing in the public sector has been
vaulted into the national limelight. Controversy has erupted over the
government's right to eliminate drugs from the workplace, juxta-
posed to the individual's fourth amendment right to be free from ar-
bitrary governmental action.2
The fourth amendment requires that all searches and seizures be
reasonable.3 With drug testing programs, reasonability is questioned
when employees are tested en masse, without suspicion of individual
drug use.4 The highly intrusive nature of compelled urination on dig-
nity and privacy interests demands that protection be afforded the in-
dividual employee. However, proponents of drug testing subordinate
these considerations to the greater interest of the public in ensuring
safety and work productivity.
In attempting to resolve this dilemma, the Supreme Court in Na-
tional Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab 5 held that mandatory
drug testing of federal employees is permissible, even without suspi-
1. On August 15, 1986, President Reagan declared a "national mobilization"
against drug abuse. He proposed a six-point program for the eradication of drugs. The
President's primary goal was a "drug free workplace for all Americans." Comment,
Behind the Hysteria of Compulsory Drug Screening in Employment: Urinalysis Can
Be a Legitimate Tool for Helping Resolve the Nation's Program if Competing Interests
of Employer and Employee are Equitably Balanced, 25 DUQ. L. REV. 597, 605 n.9
(1987); see infra notes 121-39, 278-88 and accompanying text.
2. Comment, Random Drug Testing in the Government Sector: A Violation of
Fourth Amendment Rights?, 62 TUL. L. REV. 1373, 1373 (1988). "Our country is cur-
rently debating whether the government in its capacity as an employer has the right to
subject an employee to a drug test." Id.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also infra notes 7-11 and accompanying text.
4. In order to create a safe working environment and maintain productivity, pro-
ponents of drug testing argue that uniform procedures must be implemented. How-
ever, under the fourth amendment, all searches must be "reasonable," and
reasonability requires that particularized suspicion of illicit behavior be shown. See in-
fra notes 7-29 and accompanying text.
5. 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989).
cion, if justified by compelling governmental interests. 6 Employers
hail the decision as an endorsement of drug testing. However, advo-
cates of civil liberties vehemently denounce the infringement upon
constitutional guarantees as unprecedented.
This Note will discuss the propriety of the Von Raab decision in
sanctioning governmental drug testing. Part II delineates the consti-
tutional framework for determining unreasonable searches and
seizures. It also will analyze the legislative and executive responses
to mandatory drug testing and the current confusion in the federal
courts concerning the constitutionality of testing in the absence of
suspicion of drug use. Part III will present the facts of Von Raab,
while Part IV will analyze the majority and dissenting opinions. The
weaknesses of the majority's decision will be discussed in Part V,
along with its impact on constitutional guarantees. Subsequent court
decisions delimiting the applicability of Von Raab's compelling gov-
ernmental interest rationale also will be considered. Finally, the dra-
matic impact that the national drug campaign may have in
broadening future court decisions will be discussed.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. Constitutional Framework
Under the fourth amendment of the United States Constitution,
"[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, pa-
pers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated .... ,7 The amendment safeguards the privacy, dig-
nity, and security interests of individuals against arbitrary invasion
by government officials.8 However, the fourth amendment proscribes
only "unreasonable" searches and seizures.9 As such, if the govern-
mental action is "reasonable," privacy may be invaded.10 The deter-
6. Id. at 1396.
7. U.S. CONST. amend IV.
8. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1411 (1989) (Court
considered whether railway employees involved in an accident had privacy interests in
urine samples); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967) (protections of the
fourth amendment also apply to regulatory searches); see also Delaware v. Prouse, 440
U.S. 648, 653-54 (1979) (in the absence of suspicion or otherwise lawful detention, in-
vestigative stops of automobiles made by roving patrols violate privacy interest pro-
tected under the fourth amendment); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543,
554-55 (1976) (although routine checkpoint stops "intrude to a limited extent on motor-
ists' right to 'free passage without interruption,' " such stops are constitutionally per-
missible if detention of motorists is brief).
9. The rationale of the fourth amendment is to protect against the arbitrary dis-
cretion of government agents to conduct searches of persons and places in which an
individual maintains a reasonable expectation of privacy. Note, "Jar Wars" in the
Workplace. The Constitutionality of Urinalysis Programs Designed to Eliminate Sub-
stance Abuse Among Federal Employees, 38 SYRACUSE L. REV. 937, 943 (1987).
10. A search is reasonable if reasonable grounds exist to believe that the proposed
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mination of reasonableness under the fourth amendment is made on
a case-by-case basis."
The warrant clause of the fourth amendment provides that "no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized."'12 Through the operation of this
clause, the fourth amendment establishes the means by which, and
the extent to which, an individual's privacy may be invaded. 13 The
warrant clause, in combination with the reasonableness requirement,
prompted the Supreme Court, in the seminal case of Katz v. United
States,14 to decide that warrantless searches "are per se unreasonable
under the [f]ourth [a]mendment-subject only to a few specifically
established and well-delineated exceptions."1s
In demarcating the boundaries to which warrantless searches and
seizures may be conducted, the courts have weighed the invasion of
the individual's fourth amendment rights against the government's
interest in conducting the search. 16 If the search is deemed "reason-
able" in light of the legitimate governmental interests advanced, the
search will be upheld as constitutionally sound. In conducting this
balance, case law generally has recognized the following exceptions
to the warrant requirement: (1) search incident to an arrest;17 (2) au-
tomobile search;' 8 (3) plain view;19 (4) stop and frisk;20 (5) consent;21
search will uncover evidence of a crime or violation, if the scope of the search is "not
excessively intrusive," and if the means adopted are "reasonably related to the objec-
tive of the search." Ayers, Constitutional Issues Implicated by Public Employee Drug
Testing, 14 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 337, 341 (1988) (citing Taylor v. O'Grady, 669 F.
Supp. 1422, 1436 (N.D. Ill. 1987)). For a description of the guidelines determining "rea-
sonableness," see infra note 27.
11. Brown v. Winkle, 715 F. Supp. 195, 196 (N.D. Ohio 1989) (referring to Von
Raab). "[T]ranslation of the abstract prohibition against 'unreasonable searches and
seizures' into workable guidelines for the decision of particular cases is a difficult task
which has for many years divided the members of this Court." Camara, 387 U.S. at
528.
12. U.S. CONST. amend IV.
13. Brown, 715 F. Supp. at 196.
14. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
15. Id. at 357 (footnote omitted).
16. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979) (citing United States v. Ramsey,
431 U.S. 606, 616-19 (1977); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 555 (1976)).
17. At the time of arrest, police may conduct a search of the arrestee and areas
within the arrestee's immediate control for dangerous weapons or destructible evi-
dence. See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 220-24 (1973) (police arrested
the defendant for illegally operating a motor vehicle, conducted a "pat-down" search,
and found heroin on his person). Additionally, there is no requirement that the of-
ficers fear for their safety or believe that evidence will be found. Id. at 236.
18. As long as the automobile is lawfully detained by the police, a warrantless
(6) exigent circumstances;22 (7) searches conducted at international
borders;23 and (8) administrative searches.24
In applying the constitutional framework of a search and seizure
analysis, three elements must be considered to determine the reason-
ableness of the governmental action. First, the court must determine
search may be conducted when the officer has probable cause to believe that evidence
will be found therein. See, e.g., Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 160-61 (1925)
(search of roadster valid where police had probable cause to believe that the occupants
were bootleggers). The nature of the automobile's mobility justifies the warrantless
search. Id. at 153.
19. If police are legitimately on the premises and inadvertently observe in plain
view the fruits or instrumentalities of crime, they may seize such evidence without a
warrant. See, e.g., Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 736-40 (1983) (seizure of narcotics
valid when officer was in a legitimate position to view the object and the object ap-
peared suspicious).
20. The police may legitimately stop and conduct a pat-down search of detainee's
outer clothing for weapons if the officer has an articulable, reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity, and if the officer suspects the detainee is armed and dangerous. See,
e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1968) (reasonable for officer to investigate suspi-
cious behavior and to conduct a frisk for weapons if officer believed that detainee was
"casing a stickup").
21. A warrantless search may be conducted when consent is knowingly, volunta-
rily, and intelligently given. See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248-49
(1973) (warrantless search of defendant's trunk permitted where driver of car gave
consent to conduct search and opened trunk to accommodate officer in conducting the
search).
22. The police may make a warrantless search and seizure if evidence is likely to
disappear or to be destroyed before a warrant can be obtained. See, e.g., Schmerber v.
California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-71 (1966) (taking blood sample in absence of a warrant was
reasonable where arresting officer had probable cause to believe that the defendant
was driving while intoxicated).
23. Routine searches conducted by government agents at an international border
need not be supported by a warrant or by probable cause. See, e.g., United States v.
Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 541 (1985) (detention of traveler at international
border is justified where customs officials reasonably suspect traveler to be smuggling
contraband in alimentary canal).
24. Administrative searches may assume various forms. Because of the nature of
the school environment, public school officials do not need probable cause or a prior
warrant to conduct a search. See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337-43 (1985)
(school principal validly searched student's purse because he had a reasonable suspi-
cion to believe that the purse would contain evidence of a school violation). If a search
is conducted as a regulatory search, government inspectors need not have a traditional
warrant based upon probable cause. Rather, an administrative warrant showing a neu-
tral plan of regulatory enforcement will suffice. See, e.g., Camara v. Municipal Court,
387 U.S. 523, 530-31 (1967) (inspections of businesses or residences by fire, health, or
housing officials must be made pursuant to an administrative warrant). Furthermore,
a warrant is not required when searches of highly regulated businesses are conducted.
See, e.g., Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136, 1142-43 (3d Cir.) (Racing Commission
may take random urine samples from jockeys to maintain public confidence in the
horse-racing industry), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 986 (1986). If the area is one in which
Congress has implemented a federal regulatory scheme, warrantless searches may be
conducted. See, e.g., Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 606 (1981) (pervasive regulation
of strip-mining industry); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 317 (1972) (pervasive
regulation of gun sales); Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 77
(1970) (pervasive regulation of liquor sales).
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whether a search has been made.25 Second, the court must use a two-
part inquiry to determine whether the search violated the individ-
ual's reasonable expectation of privacy: (1) whether the individual
exhibited an expectation of privacy; and (2) whether society will ac-
cept such expectation as being reasonable. 26 Finally, if society recog-
nizes the legitimacy of the individual's subjective expectation, then
the court must determine whether the search was reasonable under
the fourth amendment. 27 In the absence of a warrant, the court bal-
ances the individual's privacy expectations against the governmental
interests in conducting the search.2 8 When the invasion of privacy
expectations is minimal and the requirement of probable cause or
reasonable suspicion would otherwise frustrate the purpose behind
conducting the search, the search may still be deemed reasonable if
compelling governmental interests are advanced.29 In determining
whether mandatory drug testing violates the fourth amendment,
each of these elements must be analyzed in the proper employment
context.
B. Has the Individual's Right to Privacy Been Violated?
In guarding against arbitrary governmental acts, the individual
must exhibit a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place or items
being searched.30 Additionally, society must recognize the individ-
ual's subjective expectation of privacy as "reasonable."3 ' When ana-
lyzing drug testing in the employment setting, the employee's
subjective expectation of privacy must be examined according to the
25. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350-53 (1967).
26. See id. at 360-61 (Harlan, J., concurring). This inquiry determines the degree
of intrusiveness of any search. Searches of personal effects are considered the least
intrusive, while interferences with bodily integrity are the most intrusive. Capua v.
City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1514 (D.N.J. 1986).
27. In Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979), the Court established guidelines for the
determination of "reasonableness":
The test of reasonableness under the [f]ourth [a]mendment is not capable of
precise definition or mechanical application. In each case it requires a balanc-
ing of the need for the particular search against the invasion of personal
rights that the search entails. Courts must consider the scope of the particu-
lar intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the justification for initiat-
ing it, and the place in which it is conducted.
Id. at 559 (citations omitted).
28. Id. at 560 (Court balanced security interests of prison facility against the pri-
vacy rights of the inmates and held that cavity searches may be conducted with less
than probable cause).
29. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1417 (1989).
30. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
31. Id.
nature of his employment.32 Depending on the occupational context,
the employee may experience a diminished expectation of privacy.33
For example, because of the nature of military service, military per-
sonnel do not have the same privacy interests as civilian employees.34
Similarly, employees of pervasively regulated industries such as li-
quor sales and distribution,35 gun sales,36 mining,37 and horse racing38
enjoy a lesser expectation of privacy than those employees in indus-
tries which are not federally regulated.39 Likewise, employees whose
jobs are extremely dangerous to public welfare and safety experience
a diminished expectation of privacy.40
Society also must be able to recognize the employee's subjective ex-
pectations as "reasonable" to secure fourth amendment protection
against arbitrary searches and seizures.41 The determination of rea-
sonableness requires the application of a balancing test, weighing the
invasion of privacy rights against the need to search.42 Factors to be
weighed include the scope and manner of the search conducted and
32. See Developments in the Law, The Constitutional Issues of Drug Testing in
the Workplace, 23 WILLAMErrE L. REV. 553, 556-58 (1987) [hereinafter Constitutional
Issues].
33. Id. at 557 (suggesting that bus drivers, police officers, pilots, air traffic control-
lers, truck drivers, and nuclear plant operators have diminished expectations of pri-
vacy because of the direct effect their occupations have on the safety of others).
34. See Committee for GI Rights v. Callaway, 518 F.2d 466, 474 (D.C. Cir. 1975)
(although members of the military are entitled to constitutional protection, the need
for observance and discipline "may render permissible within the military that which
would be constitutionally impermissible outside of it").
35. See Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 77 (1970).
36. See United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316 (1972).
37. See Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 599-607 (1981).
38. See Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136, 1142 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
986 (1986).
39. This diminished expectation of privacy experienced by workers in highly regu-
lated industries is also known as the administrative search exception. See supra note
24 and accompanying text. This exception applies when "Congress has reasonably de-
termined that warrantless searches are necessary to further a regulatory scheme and
the federal regulatory presence is sufficiently comprehensive and defined that the
owner of commercial property cannot help but be aware that his property will be sub-
ject to periodic inspections undertaken for specific purposes." Donovan, 452 U.S. at
600.
40. Examples include air traffic controllers, pilots, mass transit operators, and bus
and truck drivers. See, e.g., Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct.
1402, 1418 (1989) (railroad employees' diminished expectation of privacy in pervasively
regulated industry designed to insure safety of traveling public); Rushton v. Nebraska
Pub. Power Dist., 844 F.2d 562, 566 (8th Cir. 1988) (employees of nuclear power plant
experience diminished privacy expectations); Allen v. City of Marietta, 601 F. Supp.
482, 491 (N.D. Ga. 1985) (city employees of electrical plant enjoy reduced privacy ex-
pectations due to hazardous nature of work).
41. See Constitutional Issues, supra note 32, at 558-59.
42. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337-38 (1985). "On one side of the balance
are arrayed the individual's legitimate expectations of privacy and personal security;
on the other, the government's need for effective methods to deal with breaches of
public order." Id.
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the justification for its inception.43
The issue of society's interpretation of reasonableness in the drug
testing context can be framed as follows: whether society will recog-
nize as reasonable the employee's privacy expectations in not being
compelled to donate urine samples in the scope of employment.44
The lower court in Von Raab noted that the excretion of bodily
fluids and wastes is "one of the most personal and private func-
tions."4 5 When surveillance is required as part of the chain of cus-
tody, the exposure of anatomical parts can be an extremely
humiliating experience.46 Furthermore, the results of urinalysis test-
ing reveal not only the ingestion of a substance but also disorders
such as epilepsy and diabetes.47 Because such information can be im-
properly used by employers, the employee's expectation of privacy
also embraces the personal and medical information revealed by the
chemical analysis of bodily fluids.4S
If the employee's job is deemed hazardous, society will not recog-
nize his privacy expectations in bodily fluids as "reasonable" when
weighed against public safety concerns. 49 Similarly, if the employee
is working in a highly regulated industry, society may not recognize
privacy expectations because of the need for federal regulation
within that industry.50 Thus, the employment context determines
the extent to which privacy expectations will be recognized as rea-
sonable and will be afforded protection under the fourth
amendment.51
43. Id. at 341-42.
44. Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1514 (D.N.J. 1986) ("While urine
is routinely discharged from the body, it is generally discharged and disposed of under
circumstances that warrant a legitimate expectation of privacy.").
45. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 649 F. Supp. 380, 387 (E.D.
La. 1986), vacated, 816 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1987), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 109 S. Ct.
1384 (1989).
46. Capua, 643 F. Supp. at 1514.
47. Id. at 1515. "[C]ompulsory urinalysis forces plaintiffs to divulge private, per-
sonal medical information [including epilepsy and diabetes] unrelated to the govern-
ment's professed interest in discovering illegal drug abuse." Id.
48. Id.
49. Brown v. Winkle, 715 F. Supp. 195, 197 (N.D. Ohio 1989) (court failed to recog-
nize privacy rights of candidates for selection as fire fighters because of the hazardous
nature of the work).
50. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1418 (1989); see
also Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136, 1142 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 986
(1986).
51. See supra notes 32-40 and accompanying text.
C. Whether Drug Testing Constitutes a Search?
In analyzing the constitutionality of a drug-screening program, the
taking of bodily fluids necessarily must involve a "search" recogniza-
ble under the fourth amendment. Schmerber v. California 52 was the
first case to apply a fourth amendment search and seizure analysis to
bodily intrusions.5 3 The Supreme Court found that the extraction of
blood from a suspected drunk driver was a valid search.54
Other courts have analogized the taking of urine to the involuntary
extraction of blood and have held urinalysis to be a search under the
fourth amendment.55 Both blood and urine can be chemically ana-
lyzed for remnants of recent alcohol or drug use.56 Because of the
possibility of revealing personal information,5 7 individuals have a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy in their bodily fluids.5 8 Thus, both the
taking of blood and the taking of urine constitute a search within the
meaning of the fourth amendment. 59
However, proponents of drug testing argue that a chemical analysis
performed to detect illegal substances is not a search or a seizure
under the fourth amendment.60 Unlike blood, one has no privacy ex-
pectation in bodily waste because it is abandoned once excreted from
the body.61 Thus, the proponents argue that urinalysis testing does
52. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
53. "Because we are dealing with intrusions into the human body rather that with
state interferences with property relationships or private papers-'houses, papers, and
effects'-we write on a clean slate." Id- at 767-68.
54. Id. at 771.
55. See, e.g., Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1412-13
(1989) (post-accident urinalysis test of railway employees considered a search); Capua
v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1513 (D.N.J. 1986) (urinalysis testing of fire
fighters constitutes a search under the fourth amendment); Storms v. Coughlin, 600 F.
Supp. 1214, 1217-18 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (urinalysis testing of prison inmates considered to
be a search and seizure); see also National Fed'n of Fed. Employees v. Weinberger, 818
F.2d 935, 942 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (urinalysis testing constitutes a search); Division 241,
Amalgamated Transit Union v. Suscy, 538 F.2d 1264, 1267 (7th Cir.) (blood and urinal-
ysis testing of mass transit workers constitutes a search), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1029
(1976); Jones v. McKenzie, 628 F. Supp. 1500, 1508 (D.D.C. 1986) (urinalysis testing of
public school employees considered a search and seizure), rev'd in part, vacated in
part, 833 F.2d 335 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. granted sub nom. Jones v. Jenkins, 109 S. Ct.
1633, modified and aff'd, 878 F.2d 1476 (D.C. Cir. 1989); McDonell v. Hunter, 612 F.
Supp. 1122, 1127 (S.D. Iowa 1985) (governmental taking of urine specimen is a seizure
within the meaning of the fourth amendment), aff'd as modified, 809 F.2d 1302 (8th
Cir. 1987).
56. Capua, 643 F. Supp. at 1513.
57. For types of anatomical information revealed, see supra notes 47-48 and ac-
companying text.
58. Capua, 643 F. Supp. at 1513.
59. See supra note 55.
60. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123 (1984) (lab analysis for the use
of unlawful substances is not a search).
61. This can be analogized to the disposal of trash. The Supreme Court has held
that abandoned trash is outside an individual's reasonable privacy expectations. See
Brief for United States at 30-31, National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816
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not constitute a search because society is unwilling to recognize as
reasonable the privacy interests associated with abandoned
excrement.62
Despite these countervailing arguments, the Court, since its deci-
sion in Schmerber, consistently has held that mandatory urinalysis
and blood testing constitute a search under the fourth amendment.63
D. Quantum of Suspicion
Under the letter of the law, searches are per se unreasonable ab-
sent a valid warrant based. on probable cause. 64 However, generally
recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement65 exist when "spe-
cial needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the
warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable." 66 When the
burden and delay of obtaining the warrant frustrates the governmen-
tal purpose in conducting the search 67 or reduces the deterrent effect
in responding quickly to evidence of misconduct,68 government offi-
cials must be permitted to respond without meeting the rigorous de-
mands of the warrant requirement. In such instances, a balancing
test is applied to assess the practicality of the warrant requirement
and probable cause standard.69 The test weighs the government's in-
terest in conducting the search against the individual's privacy
rights.70
The most expansively used exceptions to the warrant requirement
are searches conducted pursuant to reasonable suspicion and searches
F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1987) (No. 86-1879), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 109 S. Ct. 1384
(1989); see also California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39-42 (1988) (no reasonable expec-
tation of privacy to garbage placed in opaque bag for trash collection). See generally
United States v. Dela Espriella, 781 F.2d 1432, 1437 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v.
O'Bryant, 775 F.2d 1528, 1533-34 (11th Cir. 1985); United States v. Vahalik, 606 F.2d 99,
100-01 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1081 (1980); United States v. Crowell, 586
F.2d 1020, 1025 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 959 (1979). Despite the abandon-
ment theory, the Von Raab lower court noted that individuals maintain a legitimate
privacy expectation "until the decision is made to flush the urine down the toilet," and
the toilet is actually flushed. Von Raab, 649 F. Supp. at 387.
62. See supra notes 41-51 and accompanying text.
63. See supra note 55.
64. U.S. CONST. amend IV; see also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
See generally United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
65. See supra notes 17-24 and accompanying text.
66. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987) (emphasis added) (citing New
Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring)).
67. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 533 (1967).
68. See Griffin, 483 U.S. at 876.
69. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1414 (1989).
70. Id.
conducted under the administrative exception. 71 In New Jersey v.
TL.O.,72 the Court indicated that in the absence of a warrant,
searches generally must be based upon probable cause. 73 Only when
special needs preclude a showing of probable cause is a lesser quan-
tum of suspicion acceptable. 74 However, "a showing of individualized
suspicion is not a constitutional floor, below which a search must be
presumed unreasonable."7 5
Terry v. Ohio76 was the first case to permit limited bodily intru-
sions under a lower standard than probable cause.77 The Terry deci-
sion allows police to detain a person and conduct a limited pat-down
search for weapons.78 However, the officer must have a "reasonable,
articulable suspicion that the person has been, is, or is about to be en-
gaged in criminal activity."79
Regarding bodily searches, the reasonable suspicion standard enun-
ciated in Terry has been extended to strip searches of prison in-
mates8 0 and international travelers.8 1 This standard also has been
utilized in searches of places and personal effects. Specifically, the
courts have permitted searches of a student's belongings,8 2 a proba-
tioner's home,8 3 and work-related searches of an employee's office.8 4
The administrative search exception also evades the warrant re-
quirement in pervasively regulated industries.8 5 With heavily regu-
71. Comment, supra note 2, at 1378.
72. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
73. Id. at 340.
74. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560-61 (1976) (permanent
checkpoint stops, implemented to prohibit flow of illegal aliens across borders, com-
prised "special need" abrogating requirement of individualized suspicion).
75. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1417 (1989) (citing
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 561).
76. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
77. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 702 (1983) (citing Michigan v. Summers,
452 U.S. 692, 698 (1981)).
78. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968).
79. Place, 462 U.S. at 702 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 22).
80. See, e.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
81. See, e.g., United States v. Oyekan, 786 F.2d 832, 837 (8th Cir. 1986) (strip search
and x-ray examination of international travelers are permissible if a reasonable suspi-
cion exists that the traveler is a drug courier). But see United States v. Montoya de
Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 541 n.4 (1985) ("Because the issues are not presented today
we suggest no view on what level of suspicion, if any, is required for nonroutine border
searches such as strip, body cavity, or involuntary x-ray searches.").
82. See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341-42 (1985) (school official may
conduct search of student's personal belongings and effects when reasonable grounds
exists to suspect that the student violated a school regulation).
83. See, e.g., Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 878 (1987) (probation regime would
be unduly disrupted by requirement of probable cause).
84. See, e.g., O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 725-26 (1987) (public employer may
reasonably intrude upon privacy expectations of employee and conduct a limited
search of employee's desk if a non-investigatory, work-related purpose exists for the
search, or if employer has reasonable suspicion of employee misconduct).
85. Note, Mandatory Drug Testing of Public Sector Employees: Constitutional Im-
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lated industries, the state's interest in conducting random searches is
paramount to the employee's expectation of privacy.8 6 In the past,
this exception has been narrowly applied to industries traditionally
regulated by the federal government.8 7 However, many courts have
expanded application of the administrative search exception to other
employment contexts as a rationale for drug testing in the work-
place.8 8 Thus, the administrative search exception provides authority
for uniform testing of the workplace even absent probable cause or
reasonable suspicion that employees are using drugs.
E. The Drug Testing Cases
Under the administrative exception to the warrant requirement,
the courts have permitted drug testing in the public employment sec-
tor.8 9 Two requirements must be satisfied for a successful application
of the administrative exception: (1) a "strong state interest in con-
ducting an unannounced search" must exist; and (2) "the pervasive
regulation of the industry must have reduced the justifiable privacy
expectation of the [parties] of the search."9 0 If these two require-
ments are met, employers in the public sector may initiate
mandatory drug-testing programs en masse.
The early cases held that absent probable cause, the employer
must meet the reasonable suspicion standard to conduct valid drug
testing programs under the fourth amendment.91 Evidence of rea-
plications, 65 U. DET. L. REV. 315, 320 (1988). For a discussion of pervasively regulated
industries, see supra note 24 and accompanying text.
86. Note, supra note 9, at 950; see also Rushton v. Nebraska Pub. Power Dist., 653
F. Supp. 1510, 1524 (D. Neb. 1987); Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136, 1142 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 986 (1986).
87. See supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
88. Comment, supra note 2, at 1379. Governments are utilizing the administrative
exception to rationalize employee drug testing while attempting to "bring employment
as a whole within the administrative exception." Id.
89. See, e.g., Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
986 (1986).
90. See Constitutional Issues, supra note 32, at 566 (citing Shoemaker, 795 F.2d at
1142).
91. See, e.g., Division 241, Amalgamated Transit Union v. Suscy, 538 F.2d 1264,
1267 (7th Cir.) (permitting drug testing of bus drivers if suspected of being under the
influence of drugs), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1029 (1976); National Treasury Employees
Union v. Von Raab, 649 F. Supp. 380, 387 (E.D. La. 1986) (noting that the "dragnet ap-
proach, a large-scale program of searches and seizures made without probable cause or
even a reasonable suspicion, is repugnant to the United States Constitution"), vacated,
816 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1987), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989); Capua
v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1518 (D.N.J. 1986) (opining that "states' interest
will not be significantly impaired by the individualized reasonable suspicion stan-
sonable suspicion may include continuing absences from work, poor
work performance, accidents occurring on the job, and reports from
superiors and co-workers of improper employee behavior on the
job.92 Thus, in order to impose drug testing on the individual em-
ployee, the employer must have sufficient grounds to believe that
employee substance abuse has negatively affected work productivity
or endangered the lives of others.93
In Division 241, Amalgamated Transit Union v. Suscy,94 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that
urinalysis and blood testing of bus drivers by the City Transit Au-
thority were constitutionally valid when the employee was suspected
of being under the influence of drugs or directly involved with a seri-
ous collision or accident.95 The public interest in mass transit safety
superseded employee objection to urinalysis testing.96 However, in
these early cases, the employee still was reasonably protected from
unannounced and pervasive testing through the requirement of rea-
sonable suspicion. 97
In Allen v. City of Marietta,98 the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Georgia discussed the reasonable suspicion
standard directed in Suscy regarding the drug testing of employees in
hazardous work environments.99 The court believed that such tests
were permissible if imposed to cure or prevent employee miscon-
duct.10 0 The court analogized the rights of public employees to those
of private employees011 and stated that public employees have the
same constitutional protections as do private employees.102 The court
also believed that government employers have rights equivalent to
dard"). But see Allen v. City of Marietta, 601 F. Supp. 482, 491 (N.D. Ga. 1985) (while
upholding the reasonable suspicion standard, the court indicated in dicta that random
testing would be permissible in certain situations).
92. Constitutional Issues, supra note 32, at 565.
93. Comment, Use and Abuse of Urinalysis Testing in the Workplace: A Proposal
for Federal Legislation Limiting Drug Screening, 35 EMORY L.J. 1011, 1070 (1986).
94. 538 F.2d 1264 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1029 (1976).
95. Id. at 1267.
96. Id.
97. Id. The court held that sufficient probable cause exists to justify urinalysis
testing on operating employees if they were involved directly in an accident or sus-
pected of drug impairment. Id.
98. 601 F. Supp. 482 (N.D. Ga. 1985).
99. Id. at 491. In Allen, tests were administered to an employee working in an
electrical generating plant, an extremely hazardous environment for the employee, his
co-workers, and the public at large. Id. at 484.
100. Id. at 491.
101. Id.
102. Id. However, other commentators believe that government employees have a
diminished expectation of privacy because of their employment in the public sector.
See, e.g., Note, supra note 85, at 320. "[T]he community may legitimately demand that
[the public employee] give up some part of his or her interest in privacy and security to
advance the community's vital interest in law enforcement." Id.
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private employers in maintaining work performance and employee
productivity.103 Thus, the court's rationale for permitting drug test-
ing was to ensure public safety in a hazardous work environment.104
Although a reasonable suspicion of employee misconduct was present
in this case, the court did not require this standard as a prerequisite
to testing.10 5 Rather, the strong public interest in maintaining a safe
work environment was the controlling factor.106
Shoemaker v. Handel'0 7 was the first case to hold that, in the ab-
sence of suspicion, random drug testing does not violate the fourth
amendment. Here, the Third Circuit permitted daily random
breathalyzer testing and urine sampling of jockeys on the basis of the
administrative exception to the warrant requirement and the perva-
sive regulation of the horse racing industry.108 Because of the strong
governmental interest in the integrity of the horse racing industry,
the employees' privacy expectations had been reduced.109 Thus, the
court found that those who voluntarily choose to become involved in
a pervasively regulated industry acquiesce to its regulatory de-
mands.110 Through the administrative exception to the warrant re-
quirement, the Shoemaker court held that suspicionless drug testing
of employees is constitutionally permissible in pervasively regulated
industries.11
Many cases have criticized the Shoemaker decision as being too in-
trusive.112 In Capua v. City of Plainfield,113 the U.S. District Court
for the District of New Jersey held that mandatory urinalysis testing
103. Allen, 601 F. Supp. at 491. Since the fourth amendment does not apply to pri-
vate employers, this dictum by the court evidences a liberal view of drug testing and a
general tendency to permit implementation. See also O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709
(1987).
104. Allen, 601 F. Supp. at 491.
105. Id. The court stated that the permissibility of drug testing and other warrant-
less searches may be a "subjective factual question for the trier of fact." Id.
106. Id.
107. 795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 986 (1986).
108. Id. at 1142; see also supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
109. Shoemaker, 795 F.2d at 1142.
110. Id.; see also Constitutional Issues, supra note 32, at 563. "[W]here the em-
ployee knowingly seeks and receives federal employment in a 'pervasively regulated
industry,' the very nature of the industry along with the high degree of regulation
serves as notice that drug testing programs will be utilized." Id. (citing Shoemaker, 795
F.2d at 1142). Such notice of pervasive regulation, along with voluntary acceptance of
employment, will serve as an implied consent to drug testing schemes. Id.
111. Shoemaker, 795 F.2d at 1142.
112. See, e.g., American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Weinberger, 651 F. Supp. 726,
735 (S.D. Ga. 1986).
113. 643 F. Supp. 1507 (D.N.J. 1986).
of city fire fighters, conducted without notice or evidence of reason-
able suspicion, was highly intrusive on their privacy expectations. 1 1 4
The court distinguished Shoemaker by stating that the Shoemaker
exception to the reasonable suspicion requirement was narrowly tai-
lored to apply only in pervasively regulated industries.115 Thus, the
court denounced mandatory testing in the absence of reasonable sus-
picion of drug use or pervasive industry regulation. 116
McDonell v. Hunter117 was the first case since Shoemaker to per-
mit random drug testing." 8 Unlike Shoemaker, the McDonell case
did not involve a highly regulated industry. However, the McDonell
court analogized the state's interest in maintaining prison security to
the Racing Commission's interest in Shoemaker in safeguarding pub-
lic confidence. 119 Thus, the Eighth Circuit balanced governmental in-
terests against privacy expectations and upheld random urine testing
of prison guards who had daily contact with inmates.12 0 Although
seen as a victory for proponents of drug testing, the McDonell deci-
sion is actually narrowly construed because of the diminished expec-
tations of privacy associated with prison facilities and the strong
institutional interest in maintaining prison security.
F. Legislative and Executive Responses to Mandatory Drug Testing
In the midst of these drug testing cases, former President Reagan
declared a "War On Drugs" and signed Executive Order No.
12,564,121 on September 15, 1986. The order discussed the serious ef-
fects that drugs have on the national work force. It specifically noted
that federal employees using drugs are less efficient and less reliable
than their sober and lucid co-workers and, as a result, pose serious
risks to the safety of co-workers and the public at large.122 Addition-
ally, national security and public safety are threatened when drug-
impaired employees have access to sensitive information.123 The
overall effect of drug use by a substantial portion of the national
work force is the annual loss of billions of dollars in decreased work
114. Id. at 1514. The court stated that "[tihe invidious effect of such mass, roundup
urinalysis is that it casually sweeps up the innocent with the guilty .... " Id. at 1517.
Thus, the burden is shifted to each fire fighter to prove his innocence by means of a
"highly intrusive urine test." Id. The Capua court found such a presumption of guilt
to contradict the individual guarantees of the Constitution. Id.
115. Id. at 1518.
116. Id. at 1522.
117. 809 F.2d 1302 (8th Cir. 1987).
118. Comment, supra note 2, at 1384.
119. McDonell v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 1302, 1308 (8th Cir. 1987).
120. Id.
121. Exec. Order No. 12,564, 3 C.F.R. 224 (1987) [hereinafter Exec. Order No.
12,564].
122. Id.
123. Id.
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productivity.124
To combat the effects of employee drug use, former President Rea-
gan allocated $900 million 125 to implement drug testing, treatment,
and rehabilitative programs in the federal workplace. 126 The Execu-
tive Order required that the head of each federal agency develop a
plan for achieving the objective of a drug-free workplace.127 The
agency plan must include a policy statement, establish employee
assistance programs, maintain supervisory training programs, and
provide for a referral system to put drug users in contact with treat-
ment centers.1 2
8
The Executive Order authorizes drug testing of federal employ-
ees.1 29 Although random drug testing procedures only apply to those
employees occupying "sensitive positions,' '130 each federal agency has
124. Id.
125. Note, supra note 9, at 937.
126. See id.
127. See Exec. Order No. 12,564, supra note 121, § 2.
128. Id. §§ 2-5; see also Note, supra note 9, at 940-42.
129. Executive Order No. 12,564 provides in part:
Sec. 3. Drug Testing Programs
(a) The head of each Executive agency shall establish a program to test for
the use of illegal drugs by employees in sensitive positions. The extent to
which such employees are tested and the criteria for such testing shall be
determined by the head of each agency, based upon the nature of the
agency's mission and its employees' duties, the efficient use of agency re-
sources, and the danger to public health and safety or national security
that could result from the failure of an employee adequately to discharge
his or her position.
(b) The head of each Executive agency shall establish a program for volun-
tary employee drug testing.
(c) In addition to the testing authorized in subsections (a) and (b) of this sec-
tion, the head of each Executive agency is authorized to test an employee
for illegal drug use under the following circumstances:
(1) When there is a reasonable suspicion that any employee uses illegal
drugs;
(2) In an examination authorized by the agency regarding an accident or
unsafe practice; or
(3) As part of or as a follow-up to counseling or rehabilitation for illegal
drug use through an Employee Assistance Program.
(d) The head of each Executive agency is authorized to test any applicant for
illegal drug use.
Exec. Order No. 12,564, supra note 121, § 3.
130. See id. §§ 3(a), 7(d). An employee occupying a "sensitive position" includes
those in law enforcement, employees designated "Special Sensitive, Critical-Sensitive,
or Noncritical-Sensitive" under chapter 731 of the Federal Personnel Manual, all presi-
dential appointees, employees with "secret" and "top secret" security clearances, and
any other employee that an agency head determines is in a position involving national
security, protecting life and property, public health or safety, or involving other duties
with a "high degree of trust and confidence." Id.; Note, supra note 9, at 941 n.24.
the authority to test when a reasonable suspicion of illegal drug use
exists.131 Furthermore, an agency may conduct a drug test as a fol-
low-up to rehabilitation and treatment under the Employee Assist-
ance Program.132 Voluntary drug testing 3 3 also is to be established
for all federal employees. Only when an employee tests positive and
is unable to refrain from subsequent drug use will disciplinary action
be taken. 3 4 Despite its focus on assisting and rehabilitating the indi-
vidual user, the overall significance of Executive Order No. 12,564 is
that illegal drugs will not be tolerated in the federal workplace. 135
Pursuant to the Executive Order, Congress enacted the Drug-Free
Workplace Act in the Fall of 1988.136 The Act requires companies
seeking federal contracts in excess of $25,000 to eliminate drug use
from their premises.'3 7 Although not mandating random drug test-
ing, the Drug-Free Workplace Act requires employers to formulate
an anti-drug policy, establish a drug-awareness program, and notify
the contracting agency of any drug-related violations occurring in the
workplace, as well as any employee drug convictions. 138 Congress's
message in approving the act is that "[i]ndividuals are not endowed
with a constitutional right to either public employment or illegal
drug use . .. [and those] wishing to join the government payroll and
receive public funds must be prepared to comply with reasonable
conditions."139
With the national campaign for a "drug free America," public as
well as private employers increasingly have initiated drug testing
procedures.140 However, critics denounce random drug testing proce-
131. Exec. Order No. 12,564, supra note 121, § 3(c)(1).
132. Id. § 3(c)(3).
133. See id. § 3(b).
134. Id. § 5(d).
135. The Reagan Administration maintained a strong position against drug use.
The Executive Order provides, in part:
The Federal government, as thZ largest employer in the Nation, can and
should show the way towards achieving drug-free workplaces through a pro-
gram designed to offer drug users a helping hand and, at the same time, dem-
onstrating to drug users and potential drug users that drugs will not be
tolerated in the Federal workplace....
SECTION 1. Drug-Free Workplace.
(a) Federal employees are required to refrain from the use of illegal drugs.
(b) The use of illegal drugs by Federal employees, whether on duty or off
duty, is contrary to the efficiency of the service.
(c) Persons who use illegal drugs are not suitable for Federal employment.
Exec. Order No. 12,564, supra note 121.
136. Drug-Free Workplace Act, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 5151, 102 Stat. 4304 (1988).
137. Id.
138. Id. § 5151, at 4304-05; see also Wollner, Business Groups Oppose Bill to Limit
Drug Testing, 5 ROCHESTER Bus. J., No. 6, § 1, at 14 (1989).
139. Fain & Reynolds, Drug Testing No 4th Amendment Threat, LEGAL TIMES, May
8, 1989, at 22, col. 3.
140. Currently, about five million Americans receive drug tests during the year,
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dures as "unreasonable" under the mandates of the fourth amend-
ment. The infringement upon individual privacy expectations, in the
absence of suspicion, starkly contradicts constitutional guarantees.
The judiciary, undecided as to the validity of drug testing when in-
dividualized suspicion is absent, has exacerbated the issue with incon-
sistent rulings. Various courts have held as follows: (1) random
testing is highly intrusive of personal privacy rights in the absence of
reasonable suspicion;S41 (2) testing is permissible only when national
security is endangered or a severe threat to public safety or property
exists;142 and (3) drug testing is permissible in a highly regulated in-
dustry even in the absence of reasonable suspicion. 143 In response to
these disparate circuit court rulings, the United States Supreme
Court granted -certiorari in National Treasury Employees Union v.
Von Raab'44 to ultimately determine the constitutionality of drug
testing in the absence of reasonable suspicion.145
most of which are given as a condition of employment. Kurkjian, Justices OK Drug
Tests in Some Jobs, Boston Globe, Mar. 22, 1989, (National/Foreign), at 1. Businesses
are increasingly turning to drug testing as a means of ensuring safety and efficiency in
the work environment. According to a 1988 survey by Business and Legal Reports
Inc., approximately 32% of larger U.S. companies and 17% of smaller businesses are
likely to test job applicants. See Wollner, supra note 138, at 14.
141. See American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Weinberger, 651 F. Supp. 726, 733
(S.D. Ga. 1986) (urinalysis search highly intrusive, requiring evidence of reasonable
suspicion even when employee's position is one which could endanger public safety
and welfare); National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 649 F. Supp. 380, 387
(E.D. La. 1986) (drug testing plan is overly intrusive in absence of probable cause or
reasonable suspicion), vacated, 816 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1987), aff'd in part, vacated in
part, 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989); Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1514 (D.N.J.
1986) (urinalysis testing is a highly intrusive and humiliating experience, requiring
compliance "with minimal constitutional mandates" of reasonable suspicion).
142. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1414-15 (1989)
(government's interest in preventing casualties in railroad operations justified post-ac-
cident testing of employees and testing of employees who violate safety rules); Wein-
berger, 651 F. Supp. at 735 (court rejected random testing but equivocated that such
testing might be constitutional if national security was threatened or if an inherent
danger existed to persons or property).
143. See Rushton v. Nebraska Pub. Power Dist., 844 F.2d 562, 566 (8th Cir. 1988)
(random testing allowed because employees in highly regulated nuclear power indus-
try have a reduced expectation of privacy); Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136, 1142
(3d Cir.) (testing allowed in highly regulated horse racing business), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 986 (1986).
144. 816 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1987), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 109 S. Ct. 1384
(1989).
145. See Comment, supra note 2, at 1380 n.43.
III. BACKGROUND OF THE CASE
A. Facts
In May 1986, the Customs Service Commissioner initiated a
mandatory drug testing program for employees seeking transfer to
positions involving drug interdiction, use and possession of firearms,
or access to classified materials. Employees who refused to comply
with the screening procedures were permitted to retain current posi-
tions without any punitive consequences. However, employees with
positive test results would be subject to dismissal in the absence of a
satisfactory explanation of legitimate drug use. Test results would
not be used for criminal purposes.
Testing procedures provided that the employee report to a monitor,
provide photographic identification, and remove outer garments and
personal belongings. The employee is permitted to urinate in private,
but the monitor remains nearby to "listen for the normal sounds of
urination."1 46 The sample then is turned over to the monitor, who
examines it for temperature and color to protect against adulteration.
The monitor then attaches identification tags and a tamper proof seal
over the container. A chain of custody form is signed by the em-
ployee and initialed by the monitor. The sample is sealed in a plastic
bag and submitted to the laboratory for an enzyme-multiplied-immu-
noassay technique (EMIT) analysis for the presence of marijuana, co-
caine, opiates, amphetamines, and phencyclidine. A gas
chromatography/mass spectrometry test (GC/MS) is performed for
confirmation purposes if the EMIT results are positive. Positive test
results are reported to the medical review officer who evaluates the
tests, medical history, and any other relevant information provided
by the employee. In the absence of an employee's legitimate explana-
tion of the presence of illegal substances, the test results are provided
to the Customs Service for use in disciplinary procedures. 147
B. Procedural Facts
A suit was originally filed by a federal employees' union on behalf
of Customs employees desiring a transfer to the scrutinized positions.
Petitioners argued that the mandatory drug screening program was
an unreasonable search and seizure under the fourth amendment
which must be enjoined. The district court enjoined the program,
finding it "utterly repugnant to the United States Constitution."148
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit vacated the injunc-
146. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. 1384, 1388 (1989).
147. Id. at 1388-89.
148. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 649 F. Supp. 380, 391 (E.D.
La. 1986), vacated, 816 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1987), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 109 S. Ct.
1384 (1989).
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tion upon finding that the search was reasonable under the fourth
amendment, 49 in light of the strong governmental interests ad-
vanced.150 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine
whether suspicionless drug testing programs were reasonable under
the fourth amendment.151
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE CASE
A. Majority Opinion
In examining the constitutionality of suspicionless drug testing pro-
grams, a majority of the Court 152 held that drug testing of Customs
Service employees seeking transfer to jobs involving drug interdic-
tion or the possession and use of firearms was reasonable under the
fourth amendment.153 However, the Court found the record insuffi-
cient to determine the extent to which suspicionless drug testing of
employees with access to classified material was permitted. 54 In
coming to this decision, the Court performed the traditional analysis
of reasonableness under the fourth amendment.155
1. Positions Involving Drug Interdiction and the Use and
Possession of Firearms
In determining that mandatory drug testing constituted a search
under the fourth amendment, the Court discussed its decision in
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Association. 156 In Skinner, the
Supreme Court held that chemical testing of blood, breath, and urine
were searches which must meet the requirement of reasonableness
149. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170, 180 (5th Cir.
1987), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989). The court found that the
testing procedures were reasonable because notice was provided to the employee and
direct observation of urination was not required. Id.; see also Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at
1389.
150. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1387. These interests included maintaining "public
confidence in the integrity of the service" and ensuring employees' fitness to interdict
illegal drugs. Id. at 1389.
151. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989).
152. Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinion, joined by Chief Justice Rehn-
quist and Justices White, Blackmun and O'Connor. Justice Marshall's dissent was
joined by Justice Brennan, and Justice Scalia's dissent was joined by Justice Stevens.
Id. at 1387.
153. Id. at 1396.
154. Id.
155. See supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text.
156. 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989). Skinner was decided on the same day as Von Raab. See,
Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1390.
under the fourth amendment.157
In determining the legitimacy of individual privacy expectations
challenged by compelled urination, the Court gave a one-sentence ac-
knowledgement of the possible validity of such concerns. 158 Without
discussing the importance of bodily integrity and the great privacy
expectations traditionally afforded excretory functions, the Court
simply concluded that "certain forms of public employment may di-
minish privacy expectations .... "159
In essence, the Court applied the rationale of O'Connor v.
Ortega,160 requiring the assessment of employee privacy expectations
to be made in the context of "the operational realities of the work-
place."161 However, the rule of O'Connor permits a limited search of
an employee's office for work-related purposes when there is evi-
dence of employee misconduct.162 Thus, the Court took a rule lim-
ited to personal property searches supported by reasonable suspicion
and used it for authority to conduct a highly intrusive bodily search
without evidence of individualized suspicion. Evidently, the Court
believed the privacy expectations of the individual to be outweighed
by the importance of job descriptions that include carrying firearms
and interdicting drugs.
In analyzing the third element of the test of reasonableness, the
Court reiterated the historical development of the warrant require-
ment, probable cause, and individualized suspicion.16 3 Traditionally,
a search required a valid warrant based on probable cause.16 4
Through Supreme Court cases, exceptions developed to the warrant
requirement: (1) when special governmental needs exist;165 and (2)
when the issuance of a warrant would provide no additional protec-
tion for individual privacy expectations. 166 Here, the government's
special needs consisted of ensuring the physical fitness and integrity
of Customs officials in sensitive positions.167 Because employees
157. Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1412-13.
158. The Court stated that "[t]he interference with individual privacy that results
from the collection of a urine sample ... could be substantial in some circumstances."
Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1393 (emphasis added).
159. Id. The Court then listed various public workers with diminished privacy ex-
pectations, including employees of the U.S. Mint, and the military and intelligence
services. Id. at 1393-94.
160. 480 U.S. 709, 717 (1987).
161. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1393; see also supra note 84.
162. O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 728-29 (1987).
163. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1390-92.
164. Id. at 1390.
165. Id.; see also supra notes 65-70 and accompanying text.
166. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1391. The Court stated that the main purpose of a war-
rant is to provide notice to the individual of the scope of the search to be conducted.
Where notice is already provided to the individual employee of the testing require-
ments, a warrant would be superfluous. Id.
167. Id. at 1393.
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seeking transfer to these positions were forewarned of the prerequi-
site drug testing procedures, the Court argued that the issuance of a
warrant would not provide any additional protection to the individual
employee.168S Furthermore, the requirement of obtaining a warrant
would redirect valuable resources from the Service's primary
goals.169 In light of these elements, a warrant should not be required
for the implementation of drug testing procedures.
The Court further elaborated that, in the absence of a warrant, a
search usually must be based on probable cause. 170 However, the
Court noted that probable cause is characteristic of criminal investi-
gations and not particularly suited to regularly conducted administra-
tive searches.171 Since the urinalysis requirement in this instance
was an administrative function, routinely conducted in the promotion
of individuals to sensitive positions, there was no need for probable
cause to exist.
Additionally, the Court stated that the requirement of reasonable
suspicion also may be excused to discover or prevent the develop-
ment of dangerous conditions in which compelling governmental in-
terests are at stake.172 However, the Court failed to delineate
circumstances in which reasonable suspicion may be overlooked.
In the absence of suspicion, governmental interests are weighed
against individual privacy concerns to determine whether a search
may still be considered reasonable under the fourth amendment.173
If the governmental interests are sufficiently compelling and the in-
terference with individual privacy rights are relatively minor, then
the search will be constitutionally permissible.174
In conducting this balance, the majority of the Court greatly em-
phasized the importance of the governmental interests at stake,
while giving passing reference to individual privacy concerns. 175 The
168. Id. at 1391; see supra note 166.
169. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1391.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 1391-92. For authority, the Court cited Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367,
371 (1987) (inventory search of suspect's van); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428
U.S. 543, 557 (1976) (vehicle stops near the Mexican border); and Camara v. Municipal
Court, 387 U.S. 523, 535-36 (1967) (apartment search by a housing inspector).
172. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1391-92. Without citing to clear authority, the Court
stated that case precedent has dismissed any measure of particularized suspicion when
the government's need to prevent and discover the development of dangerous condi-
tions so requires. Id.
173. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
174. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
175. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1392-96; see also supra note 64 and accompanying text.
Court believed that the state has compelling interests in safeguarding
public confidence in the integrity of the Customs Service while main-
taining the physical fitness of officials in sensitive positions.176 The
Court elaborated on the important role that the Customs Service
plays in protecting the nation's borders against drug traffickers.177
Alternatively, the Court hypothecated as to the damage which would
be inflicted upon society if corrupted Customs officials were placed in
charge of drug interdiction.178 Drug use by Customs officials would
not only serve to undermine public confidence, but also would endan-
ger the safety of co-workers and the public at large179 and would sub-
ject society to the possible importation of sizeable narcotics
shipments. The Court held that in view of the potential harm to the
nation's well-being that corrupted officials could inflict, the state's in-
terest in preventing the promotion of drug users to sensitive positions
is paramount to individual privacy concerns. 8 0 Evidently, the Court
was so adamant in its moral convictions concerning the importance of
the governmental interests at stake that it found it unnecessary to
even weigh the competing concerns of individual privacy rights.
The Court addressed two additional points presented by the peti-
tioners concerning the reasonableness of the Customs testing pro-
gram. First, the petitioners argued that the drug screening program
was not implemented in response to evidence of suspected drug use
within the Service and was therefore unjustified in its inception and
inappropriate in application.' 8 ' To support their argument, the peti-
tioners cited statements made by the Service's Commissioner one
month before the program was implemented. The Commissioner
stated that "[t]he Customs Service has been known throughout the
law enforcement community as an agency whose employees demon-
strate noteworthy integrity," and that he believed that the Service
was "largely drug free." 8 2 The Commissioner also admitted that the
scope of substance abuse was not the reason for the program's
implementation. 83
176. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1393.
177. Id. at 1392. The Court characterized the magnitude of the drug problem as one
which "affect[s] the health and welfare of our population" and one which has created a
"veritable national crisis in law enforcement." Id. (citing United States v. Montoya de
Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 538 (1985)).
178. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1393. The Court believed that "sizable drug ship-
ments" would be imported into the states if customs officials actively collaborated with
drug traffickers or were "unsympathetic to [the Customs Service's] mission of in-
terdicting drugs." Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 1396.
181. Id. at 1394.
182. See Brief for Petitioners at 7, National Treasury Employees Union v. Von
Raab, 816 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1986) (No. 86-1879), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 109 S.
Ct. 1384 (1989) [hereinafter Brief for Petitioners].
183. Id.
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The petitioners additionally presented statistics illustrating the
inappropriateness of the drug screening program in the Customs Ser-
vice. During the three-month period prior to the district court's in-
junction, only five out of 3600 samples tested were reported as
confirmed positive.' 8 4 Thus, petitioners argued that the infringement
upon privacy rights could not be justified when random testing was
implemented in an area of public service which was relatively drug
free.185
In response, the Court extrapolated that drug abuse is an all-perva-
sive societal problem which has permeated the American work-
place. 186 The court rationalized the propriety of urinalysis testing by
stating that the fact that the majority of the employees tested were
free from fault did not make the program unsuitable,187 especially
when the harm against which the government sought to protect was
substantial. 88
The petitioners presented a second argument concerning the effec-
tiveness of urinalysis testing when the employee could take steps to
avoid discovery of drug use.189 By abstaining from drug use, drinking
additional fluids, or adding minute amounts of soap or salt to the
urine sample as a neutralizing agent,190 the employee could success-
fully evade detection. The Court refuted the claims of abstinence as
a means of thwarting chemical detection by acknowledging the igno-
rance of users as to the "fade-away effect" of various drugs.191 The
Court also believed the number of successful adulteration attempts
would be minimized by the preventative measures taken by the mon-
itor prior to sealing the container.192 As a result, those attempting to
184. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct at 1394.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 1395. "Petitioners do not dispute, nor can there be doubt, that drug
abuse is one of the most serious problems confronting our society today. There is little
reason to believe that American workplaces are immune from this pervasive social
problem .... Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. The petitioners believed the Customs' drug testing program was not a
"'sufficiently productive mechanism to justify [its] intrusion upon [f]ourth
[a]mendment interests,' because illegal drug users can avoid detection with ease ... 
Id. at 1395 (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 658-59 (1979)).
190. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 182, at 5 n.7.
191. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1396. For example, the common drug user is unaware
that marijuana is detectable only for about one day if used once per week; three days if
used between two to six times per week; and approximately 5.3 days if used on a daily
basis for longer than six months. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 182, at 9.
192. The monitor retrieves the sample from the employee promptly after urination
deceive the test by abstaining from drug use or tampering with the
sample most likely would be disappointed.193
2. Positions with Access to Classified Material
In analyzing the random testing of employees seeking transfer to
positions with access to classified material, the Court recognized the
compelling governmental interests involved in safeguarding highly
sensitive information. 94 However, the Court remanded this portion
of the case to determine the scope of employment categories which
should be covered under a drug testing program of this type.195 Evi-
dently, the Court approved the random drug testing of employees
with access to sensitive information. A distinction was made, how-
ever, between "sensitive information,"196 to which the Court was
willing to provide protection, and "classified material," as defined by
the Customs Service.
The Customs Service had designated certain positions, such as ac-
countants, animal caretakers, attorneys, baggage clerks, co-op stu-
dents, electricians, mail clerks, and messengers, as requiring
toxicological testing because of their potential access to classified
materials.197 The Court held these categorical groupings to be too
broadly defined because not all of these employees would gain access
to sensitive information.198 The Court did not define either term,
however, and remanded the case with instructions for the lower
court to assess the criteria used by the Service in its determination of
"classified materials."'199
The majority opinion advocated the application of a balancing test
to determine the reasonableness of random drug screening to secure
the confidentiality of sensitive information.2° ° The Court remanded
the case with instructions to the lower court to weigh the competing
interests of employees' privacy expectations and the degree of super-
vision presently maintained in the absence of drug testing.201
Although the Court approved of the drug testing program in this in-
stance, as based upon the compelling governmental interests ration-
ale, it left to the appellate court the duty of defining the boundaries
of its application.
and tests it for proper color and temperature. For testing procedures, see supra text
accompanying notes 147-48.
193. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1396.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 1397.
196. Id.; see also supra note 130.
197. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1397 (emphasis added).
198. Id. (emphasis added).
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
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B. Dissenting Opinions
The dissenting opinion of Justice Marshall20 2 denounced the major-
ity Court's abandonment of probable cause as required under the
fourth amendment.2 03 Justice Marshall failed to elaborate on his rea-
sons for dissenting, but referred to his dissenting opinion in Skinner
v. Railway Labor Executives' Association for support.204 In Skinner,
Justice Marshall condemned the Court's implementation of massive,
post-accident testing procedures of railway workers.205 Justice Mar-
shall felt that the majority court ignored "the text and doctrinal his-
tory of the [f]ourth [a]mendment," requiring intrusive searches to be
conducted pursuant to probable cause. 206 By dispensing with this
constitutional requirement,207 the Supreme Court ensured that the
"worst casualty of the war on drugs will be the precious liberties of
our citizens."208
The dissenting opinion of Justice Scalia209 agreed with the majority
that a search may be conducted in the absence of probable cause or
reasonable suspicion if special needs exist.210 However, Justice Scalia
diverged from the majority by identifying those special needs as so-
cial, as opposed to governmental.211 He provided examples of social
needs, such as maintaining order in the classroom where drugs and
violence pervade;212 detecting the entrance of illegal aliens;213 and
202. Id. at 1398 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan joined in Justice Mar-
shall's dissent.
203. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
204. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
205. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1423 (1989) (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting).
206. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
207. In Skinner, Marshall recognized that through case law, a lesser quantum of
suspicion has been sustained when privacy invasions are minimal and government con-
duct falls short of "a full-scale search." Id. at 1424 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Adminis-
trative searches pursuant to a regulatory plan, also have been permitted in the absence
of suspicion when the encounters are brief and nonintrusive. Id. (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing). However, the Court's extension of the "special needs" exception for chemical
testing of bodily fluids, when the nature of the search is highly intrusive and, in the
absence of particularized suspicion, has served to read "the probable cause require-
ment out of the [f]ourth [a]mendment." Id. at 1423 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
208. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
209. Justice Scalia wrote a separate dissent with whom Justice Stevens joined.
210. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1398 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
211. The determination of whether a search is reasonable depends upon "the social
necessity that prompts the search." Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
212. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 339 (1985). "[D]rug use and violent
crime in the schools have become major social problems." Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1399
(Sca lia, J., dissenting).
213. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 551-52 (1976).
preventing drug-related railroad collisions.214 Each of these exam-
ples serves to characterize the pervasive social need by longevity of
the problem and seriousness of the harm.
Justice Scalia's dissent found no social need justifying the abandon-
ment of particularized suspicion by the Customs Service in the drug
testing program. 215 Historically, there had been no pervasive prob-
lem of drug addiction by Customs employees. 216 In fact, the Customs
Commissioner stated that the Service is "largely drug-free" and that
the reason for urinalysis testing was not employee substance
abuse. 217 Thus, the majority's broad generalizations concerning the
pervasiveness of drug use as a societal problem and its evident per-
meation into the American workplace were too attenuated to justify
random drug testing.218
Likewise, there was no documented evidence as to the gravity of
the harm inflicted by physically impaired Customs employees. 219
Although the majority opinion hypothesized the "irreparable dam-
age" which could occur when "unsympathetic" employees are placed
in charge of drug interdiction,220 there was no demonstrated evidence
of such catastrophic injury. Unlike the railroad industry, in which
forty-five drug impaired accidents occurred during an eight-year pe-
riod, resulting in thirty-four deaths and millions of dollars in prop-
erty damage,22 1 the majority failed to cite to specific instances of
serious social harm within the Customs Service.
As a result, the Customs Service's drug testing program would "do
little to alleviate the hypothetical dangers of corruption and unsafe
use of firearms conjured up as justification for it."222 Nor would such
testing serve to eliminate ethical infractions among those Customs of-
ficials who do not use drugs.223 Thus, Justice Scalia believed that the
majority's justification for the impairment of individual liberties, in
the absence of a pressing social need, was exemplary. 224 If the offi-
cials who enforce our country's laws do not personally comply with
214. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1402 (1989).
"[T]he problem of alcohol use on American railroads is as old as the industry itself
.... .Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1399 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Skinner, 109 S. Ct.
at 1407 & n.1).
215. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1400 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
216. Id. at 1399-1400 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
217. See supra notes 182-83 and accompanying text.
218. See Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1395.
219. Id. at 1400 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
220. See id. at 1393-94; see also supra notes 179-81 and accompanying text.
221. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1400 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
222. Taylor, Drug Test Case Rips Into Privacy, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 27, 1989, at 15.
223. Id.
224. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1401 (Scalia, J., dissenting). "What better way to show
that the Government is serious about its 'war on drugs' than to subject its employees
on the front line of that war to this invasion of their privacy and affront to their dig-
nity?" Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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their mandates, then neither will the public at large. 225
Justice Scalia objected to this symbolic justification for an other-
wise unreasonable search.226 Absent a pervasive social harm demon-
strating a specific need for drug testing procedures, searches which
are particularly offensive to human dignity should not be deemed
reasonable under the fourth amendment.227 The validation of such
searches serves as "a kind of immolation of privacy and human dig-
nity in symbolic opposition to drug use." 228
V. IMPACT
The majority opinion in Von Raab is a moral and passionate deci-
sion shaped by popular desires and the urgency of the national cam-
paign to eradicate illegal drugs. It stands as a symbol of
governmental intolerance for drug use; however, it also is an omen
forecasting the erosion of more constitutional guarantees. Although
laudable in its attempts to prevent the scourge of drugs from enter-
ing America's frontier, the decision is ill-conceived as it serves to dis-
parage the Constitution and ravish the rights of the individual.
A. Weaknesses in the Majority Opinion
The majority attempts to justify the infringement upon constitu-
tional protections through a compelling governmental interest ration-
ale. However, the Court's argument evades the principle issues at
bar and is wrought with defective reasoning. In applying the consti-
tutional framework for analyzing fourth amendment violations, the
Court ineffectively discussed the elements of the test of
reasonableness.
In determining whether the reasonable expectations of the em-
ployee were violated, the Court completely ignored the significant
impact that compelled urination and disposal of bodily fluids has on
privacy expectations. 229 The Court did not address the legitimacy of
225. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
226. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
227. See id. at 1400 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
228. Id. at 1398 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
229. Even the appellate court recognized the significance of bodily intrusions on
privacy expectations:
There are few activities in our society more personal or private than the pass-
ing of urine. Most people describe it by euphemisms if they talk about it at
all. It is a function traditionally performed without public observation; in-
deed, its performance in public is generally prohibited by law as well as social
custom.
such concerns nor did it address whether society would recognize em-
ployees' privacy expectations as reasonable. 230 To determine the le-
gitimacy of privacy expectations, courts normally weigh individual
privacy rights against the need to search, the scope of the search, and
the nature of the work environment. 231 If the workplace is excep-
tionally hazardous or federally regulated, the employee's privacy ex-
pectations necessarily will be reduced.232 In these situations, highly
intrusive searches will more likely be permitted.
Rather, the Court simply stated that the infringement upon pri-
vacy expectations from compelled urination "could be substantial in
some circumstances."233 The fact that the Court delegated only one
sentence of its majority opinion to an issue which has split the fed-
eral circuits evidences the Court's superficial analysis and its obvious
bias in favor of drug screening. By ignoring individual privacy con-
cerns, the Court severely weakened its position by not giving fair and
equal treatment to issues traditionally regarded as indispensable to
any fourth amendment analysis.
In determining the reasonableness of the search, the Court failed
to provide case law justifying the abandonment of individualized sus-
picion in the absence of a valid warrant.23 4 Through case law, how-
ever, an exception to the requirement of reasonable suspicion has
evolved in connection with administrative searches.235 In the absence
of suspicion, administrative searches may be conducted in highly reg-
ulated industries or when public health, safety, and welfare is at
stake.236 In all other situations, reasonable suspicion must be present
prior to implementation of drug testing procedures. 237 Here, the
main controversy is whether the standard of reasonable suspicion
may be ignored in industries which are not pervasively regulated,
where a severe threat to public safety is not posed. The Court did
not present an effective argument concerning the tangible risks to
which society is exposed in the absence of drug testing in the Cus-
toms Service. 238 However, by applying the balancing test and by
trumpeting the compelling governmental interest rationale, the
Court furtively circumvented the requirement of reasonable
suspicion.
National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170, 175, aff'd in part, va-
cated in part, 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989).
230. See supra notes 30-51 and accompanying text.
231. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
232. See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
233. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
234. See supra notes 28, 173 and accompanying text.
235. Note, supra note 9, at 950-52.
236. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
237. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
238. See supra notes 212-14 and accompanying text.
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The balancing test applied by the Court failed to weigh the coun-
tervailing interests of individual rights in determining the reasona-
bleness of random drug testing. Again, the Court believed the
governmental interests in protecting America's frontier and main-
taining public confidence were so important that they justified in-
fringements upon individual privacy rights. However, the Court's
flaw was in failing to recognize the countervailing individual inter-
ests at stake.
Instead of ignoring individual rights, the Court should have recog-
nized the validity of such concerns and expounded upon the Service's
attempts to minimize the intrusiveness of the search. By providing
advance notice to the employee of the requirements of toxicological
testing and by not requiring direct observation of urination by the
monitor, the Service limited the interference with personal privacy
rights to some extent. Additionally, the search was limited in scope
for it only applied to employees seeking promotion to certain posi-
tions within the Customs Service. Thus, the Court could have argued
that since the privacy intrusions were minimal and important gov-
ernmental interests were thereby advanced, the Customs' program of
drug testing was reasonable under the fourth amendment. Instead,
the Court applied a manipulable balancing inquiry which tipped the
scales of justice in favor of governmental testing without even giving
weight to the privacy concerns of the individual.
Further weaknesses in the majority opinion are evident in the
Court's response to petitioners' arguments. Regarding the petition-
ers' concerns over the inappropriateness of urinalysis testing in an
area of public service reputed to be essentially drug free,239 the Court
responded with a tangential discussion of the difficulty of discovering
drug impairment and the need for deterring drug use both on and off
duty to protect against the dangers of bribery and blackmail. 240
Here, the Court's discussion, as presented in response to petitioners'
concerns, has no relevancy concerning the unsuitability of drug test-
ing in the absence of drug use in the work environment.
Instead of side-stepping this issue, the Court should have empha-
sized the validity of the testing procedures as a means of drug deter-
rence rather than as a means of drug detection. It is highly probable
that the implementation of drug testing procedures has served as an
incentive for employees to cease their illegal habits in anticipation of
239. See supra notes 181-85 and accompanying text.
240. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. 1384, 1395 (1989).
job advancement.241 Thus, the Court could have effectively asserted
that the program is not inappropriate in that it has served to deter
drug use by those employees seeking positions requiring the carrying
of firearms or the interdiction of illegal substances.
Further flaws in the majority opinion also were evidenced in re-
sponse to the petitioners' second argument concerning the ineffec-
tiveness of testing procedures.242 Petitioners presented expert
testimony in the lower court as to the ability of resourceful employ-
ees to avoid detection through abstinence and fluid intake.243 With
the exception of addicts, most drug users would be able to produce a
"clean sample" within seven days.244 Expert testimony also was em-
ployed concerning the inability to anticipate the fade-away effect of
various drugs.245 The Court severely discredited its analysis by only
addressing the latter testimony. By failing to refute or even acknowl-
edge expert evidence as to successful drug evasion, 246 the Court was
unable to validly judge the effectiveness of the drug testing program.
In conclusion, the majority's analysis, as written by Justice Ken-
nedy, tends to skirt the issues at hand in determining the reasonable-
ness of mandatory drug testing, dodge the petitioners' inquiries, and
hide behind the merits of the government's interests in securing the
nation's borders. The majority does not address the significance of
the individual privacy interests infringed upon, nor does it adequately
discuss the reasons for circumventing the requirement of reasonable
suspicion. Rather, the Court uses the compelling governmental inter-
ests rationale as a prop to support its decision to affirm the constitu-
tionality of random drug testing.
B. The Companion Case-Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives
Association
The United States Supreme Court decided. both Skinner v. Rail-
241. In response to the statistics presented by petitioners, the Court could have
made the argument that the minute number of confirmed positive results can be
viewed as proving the deterrence effect of drug testing.
242. See supra notes 189-93 and accompanying text.
243. See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
244. See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 182, at 9 n.12 (testimony of John Morgan
and Dr. David Greenblatt).
245. The expert indicated that the amount of "time it takes for particular drugs to
become undetectable in urine can vary widely depending on the individual and may
extend for as long as 22 days." National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 109
S. Ct. 1384, 1396 (1989).
246. See Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1396. The "[u]ndisputed expert testimony in this
case demonstrated that with a few days notice, virtually any individual who uses drugs,
except those whose use is so habitual as to be detectable simply by observation on the
job, can escape detection through urinalysis merely by temporary abstinence." Brief
for Petitioners, supra note 182, at 9.
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way Labor Executives' Association247 and Von Raab on the same day.
Skinner held that post-accident drug testing of railroad workers was
permissible without reasonable suspicion of drug impairment at the
time the accident occurred.248
In viewing the holdings in Skinner and Von Raab together, it may
be said that the Supreme Court has "torn a gaping hole in the
[f]ourth [a]mendment." 249 However, the context in which the gov-
ernment may employ mandatory drug testing is limited to: (1) the
Customs Service when it believes that a drug-free work force is nec-
essary to its essential mission of stopping drug trafficking across the
nation's borders;250 (2) situations in which the government maintains
a truly compelling interest in sensitive information; 25 1 and (3) the
heavily regulated transportation industry where public safety is at
stake.252 Thus, the twin decisions appear only to affect jobs involving
law enforcement, national security, or public health, welfare, and
safety.
Regarding the historical development of search and seizure cases,
Skinner comports with the reasonableness requirement of the Con-
stitution through the administrative exception to the warrant re-
quirement. The privacy expectations of railroad employees are
considerably reduced due to their employment in a highly regulated
industry.253 Additionally, the governmental interest in protecting the
safety of the traveling public is significant.254 Thus, in the employ-
ment context of a pervasively regulated industry, the state's interest
in conducting mandatory drug testing procedures is paramount to the
employee's privacy expectations. 255
However, the Court's decision in Von Raab appears to be an anom-
aly when viewed from the historical perspective. Von Raab does not
comport with the administrative exception to the warrant require-
ment because the Customs Service is not a pervasively regulated in-
247. 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989).
248. Id. at 1421.
249. Taylor, Trashing the 4th Amendment, Again, Manhattan Law., Mar. 28, 1989-
Apr. 3, 1989 (Commentary), at 10. "In justifying their result, the majority propelled
the law down a conceptual slippery slope toward a standardless regime in which inno-
cent individuals who are suspected of no crime could be searched en masse whenever
the government could convince the Court that it had a good enough reason." Id.
250. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1396.
251. Id. at 1397.
252. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1422 (1989).
253. Id. at 1418.
254. Id. at 1419.
255.. See supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
dustry. Similarly, the promotion of drug users to positions requiring
the use of firearms, access to classified materials, or front-line drug
interdiction does not involve public safety to an appreciable de-
gree. 25 6 Thus, Von Raab deviates from the general rule requiring
reasonable suspicion when the administrative exception does not
apply.
The main question at hand is: How far and to what extent will the
Supreme Court go to find mandatory drug testing of public employ-
ees reasonable under the fourth amendment? Skinner represents
the traditional application of fourth amendment principles. Von
Raab represents an extension of these principles through its compel-
ling governmental interests rationale. It is apparent that the
Supreme Court, without regard to palpable public safety concerns, is
willing to expand the administrative search exception to employment
contexts other than pervasively regulated industries.
C. Subsequent Drug Testing Cases
Given the wide range of latitude embodied in the Von Raab com-
pelling governmental interest rationale, the district courts have been
somewhat conservative in implementing suspicionless drug testing
programs in different employment environments. Basically, subse-
quent cases have restricted testing to those employees having the po-
tential to detrimentally affect health, safety, and welfare. Thus,
despite the abandonment of pervasive regulation, public safety is still
a viable concern under the administrative search exception.
Because of the hazardous nature of the work environments and the
corresponding effects on public safety, the courts have extended sus-
picionless drug testing programs to police and fire departments.25 7 In
Brown v. City of Detroit,258 the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Michigan drew closely from the Von Raab decision and
held that there were similarities between Customs officials and police
officers employed with the power to use deadly force. 25 9 Based upon
the public safety rationale,260 the court in Brown upheld random
testing procedures.2 61 However, it limited such examinations to of-
256. See supra notes 212-13 and accompanying text.
257. See Guiney v. Roache, 873 F.2d 1557, 1558 (1st Cir.) (upholding drug testing of
police officers who carry firearms and who interdict drug traffickers), cert. denied, 110
S. Ct. 404 (1989); Brown v. City of Detroit, 715 F. Supp. 832, 834-35 (E.D. Mich. 1989)
(sustaining city police department's random drug testing program based on public
safety rationale).
258. 715 F. Supp. 832 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
259. Id. at 833-35.
260. "[Tjhe public should not bear the risk that employees who may suffer from
impaired perception and judgment will be promoted to positions where they may need
to employ deadly force." Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1393.
261. Brown, 715 F. Supp. at 833-35. In Von Raab, the drug testing program was not
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ficers carrying firearms or enforcing the city's drug laws.262 The
striking similarities between Von 'Raab and Brown demanded that
mandatory drug testing be extended to other law enforcement
contexts.
Similarly, in Brown v. Winkle,263 the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Ohio held that drug testing requirements for
candidate selections to the fire department did not violate fourth
amendment privacy rights.264 The successful performance of fire
fighters' duties "depends uniquely on their judgment and dexter-
ity."265 Thus, public safety demands that fire fighters not use "drugs,
alcohol, or other performance altering substances while at work, or
at other times when the residual effects of use would tend to impair
functioning... ,"266 The court stated that it was not unconstitutional
to deny drug users employment "in an occupation where proper per-
formance is a matter of life and death .... "267
Post Von Raab decisions have recognized that to sustain suspi-
cionless drug testing under the public safety rationale, the risk
threatened by impaired conduct must pose an immediate danger. In
Thomson v. Marsh,268 the risk of harm associated with the residual
effects of drug use in a chemical weapons plant was immediate be-
cause the slightest release of the chemical agent "CK" would kill any
employee working within a few feet of exposure and seriously injure
anyone standing a few yards away.269 Because of the dangerous na-
ture of experimental testing with lethal chemical agents, the Fourth
Circuit held that civilian employees working for the Army in the
Chemical Personnel Reliability Program experienced a diminished
expectation of privacy concerning urinalysis testing.270
Similarly, in American Federation of Government Employees,
randomly implemented because it was a one-time exam required by specific employees
requesting promotion to sensitive positions. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1390. In Brown,
the district court expanded the scope of testing procedures by permitting random and
periodic testing of police officers who carry guns or who interdict drug traffickers.
Brown, 715 F. Supp. at 833-35.
262. Brown, 715 F. Supp. at 833-35.
263. 715 F. Supp. 195 (N.D. Ohio 1989).
264. Id. at 196-98.
265. Id. at 197 (citation omitted).
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. 884 F.2d 113 (4th Cir. 1989).
269. Id. at 115.
270. Id. at 114-15.
AFL-CIO v. Skinner,271 random drug testing was again upheld for
employees whose duties bore a "direct and immediate impact on pub-
lic health and safety, the protection of life and property, law enforce-
ment or national security." 272 The immediacy of the danger posed to
hazardous material inspectors273 consisted of exposure "to poisonous,
explosive, and highly flammable commodities that could be ... sud-
denly ignited by improper handling."2 74 The D.C. Circuit further
recognized the direct impact that improper installation and mainte-
nance of flight control equipment by aircraft mechanics could have
on life and property. 275 Thus, the more immediate and harmful the
consequences resulting from any single drug-impaired incident, the
more likely that random drug testing will be sustained by the
courts.
2 7 6
Under the authority provided by Von Raab, it is apparent that
lower federal courts could broadly use the compelling governmental
interests rationale to justify random urinalysis testing in many work-
ing environments. However, the courts in cases subsequent to the
Von Raab decision have restricted application of suspicionless drug
testing programs to those contexts in which an immediate and tangi-
ble risk of harm to public safety and welfare exists.
D. The National Campaign
Since Ronald Reagan's declaration of a "War On Drugs" in 1986,277
the Presidential crusade for a "drug-free America" has gathered pop-
ular momentum. Highlighted by media coverage,2 78 the chilling
271. 885 F.2d 884 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
272. Id. at 889.
273. Three groups of employees brought the challenge in this case: motor vehicle
operators, Federal Railroad Administration inspectors of hazardous materials, and
Federal Aviation Administration Aircraft mechanics. Id. at 891.
274. Id. (citation omitted).
275. Id. at 892 ("[A] drug-related lapse could portend irreparable injury to life and
property .. "); see also National Fed'n of Fed. Employees v. Cheney, 884 F.2d 603, 610
(D.C. Cir. 1989) (sustaining Army's testing of air traffic controllers, pilots, and aviation
mechanics because of the "irreversible and calamitous consequences" which could en-
sue), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 864 (1990).
276. See, e.g., Harmon v. Thornburgh, 878 F.2d 484 (D.C. Cir. 1989). In Harmon, the
court held that an indirect risk of harm associated with a mistake by a Justice Depart-
ment attorney is not the kind of harm contemplated by the public safety rationale. Id.
at 491. "The public safety rationale adopted in Von Raab and Skinner focused on the
immediacy of the threat." Id. (emphasis in original). "[A] single slip-up by a gun-car-
rying agent or a train engineer may have irremediable consequences; the employee
himself will have no chance to recognize and rectify his mistake, nor will other gov-
ernment personnel have an opportunity to intervene before the harm occurs." Id.
277. See supra notes 121-35 and accompanying text.
278. Major newspapers are devoting pages to the subject of drugs, and the televi-
sion networks are filling much of their air time with the drug issue. "ABC calls its
coverage 'Drugs: A Plague Upon the Land.' NBC's is 'Drug Watch.' CBS ... calls it
'Drugs: One Nation, Under Siege.'" Rosenstiel, Media Going All-Out on Drug Cover-
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repercussions of drug use have been brought home to the American
public. The horrible realities of drug use include babies being born
addicted to cocaine, children dealing narcotics at school, and gang-
land members waging territorial wars in our cities and streets.279 As
age, L.A. Times, Sept. 7, 1989, Part I, at 16, col. 1. The White House maintains that
"saturation air time serves the President's purpose and will help them sell to Congress
a policy that is still controversial in its details." Id.
279. In enacting the United States' policy for a drug-free America by 1995, Con-
gress listed certain statistical findings concerning the detrimental effects of illegal drug
use:
Sec. 5251. United States Policy For A Drug-Free America By 1995.
(a) FINDINGS.-The Congress finds that-
(1) approximately 37 million Americans used an illegal drug in the past
year and more than 23 million Americans use illicit drugs at least
monthly, including more than 6 million who use cocaine;
(2) half of all high school seniors have used illegal drugs at least once, and
over 25 percent use drugs at least monthly;
(3) illicit drug use adds enormously to the national cost of health care and
rehabilitation services;
(4) illegal drug use can result in a wide spectrum of extremely serious
health problems, including disruption of normal heart rhythm, small
lesions of the heart, high blood pressure, leaks of blood vessels in the
brain, bleeding and destruction of brain cells, permanent memory loss,
infertility, impotency, immune system impairment, kidney failure, and
pulmonary damage, and in the most serious instances, heart attack,
stroke, and sudden death;
(5) approximately 25 percent of all victims of AIDS acquired the disease
through intravenous drug use;
(6) over 30,000 people were admitted to emergency rooms in 1986 with
drug-related health problems, including 10,000 for cocaine alone;
(7) there is a strong link between teenage suicide and use of illegal drugs;
(8) 10 to 15 percent of all highway fatalities involve drug use;
(9) illegal drug use is prevalent in the workplace and endangers fellow
workers, national security, public safety, company morale, and
production;
(10) it is estimated that 1 of every 10 American workers have their produc-
tivity impaired by substance abuse;
(11) it is estimated that drug users are 3 times as likely to be involved in
on-the-job accidents, are absent from work twice as often, and incur 3
times the average level of sickness costs as non-users;
(12) the total cost to the economy of drug use is estimated to be over
$100,000,000,000 annually;
(13) the connection between drugs and crime is also well-proven;
(14) the use of illicit drugs affects moods and emotions, chemically alters
the brain, and causes loss of control, paranoia, reduction of inhibition,
and unprovoked anger;
(15) drug-related homicides are increasing dramatically across the Nation;
(16) 8 of 10 men arrested for serious crimes in New York City test positive
for cocaine use;
(17) illicit drug use is responsible for a substantially higher tax rate to pay
for local law enforcement protection, interdiction, border control, and
the cost of investigation, prosecution, confinement, and treatment;
(18) substantial increases in funding and resources have been made avail-
able in recent years to combat the drug problem, with spending for in-
a result of the anti-drug campaign and its inflammatory effects on
popular opinion, America has embarked upon an era of drug intoler-
ance. Consequentially, the issue of mandatory drug testing has been
thrust into the national spotlight.
An example is the declaration by the 100th Congress that the "pol-
icy of the United States Government [is] to create a Drug-Free
America by [the year] 1995."280 In furtherance of this goal, President
Bush announced in September 1989 a national drug strategy coordi-
nating the efforts of all federal agencies. 281 The President proposed a
budget of $7.9 billion to implement this latest war.28 2 Domestically,
this strategy calls for the enlargement of the criminal justice system
at all levels of government, including the installation of more prisons,
jails, courts, and prosecutors. 28 3 Stiffer fines and penalties for illegal
drug use also are advocated.28 4 Additionally, the President empha-
sized greater use of drug-testing programs by state and municipal
terdiction, law enforcement, and prevention programs up by 100 to 400
percent and these programs are producing results-
(A) seizures of cocaine are up from 1.7 tons in 1981 to 70 tons in 1987;
(B) seizures in heroin are up from 460 pounds in 1981 to 1,400 pounds
in 1987;
(C) Drug Enforcement Administration drug convictions doubled be-
tween 1982 and 1986; and
(D) the average sentence for Federal cocaine convictions rose by 35
percent during this same period;
(19) despite the impressive rise in law enforcement efforts, the supply of
illegal drugs has increased in recent years;
(20) the demand for drugs creates and sustains the illegal drug trade; and
(21) winning the drug war not only requires that we do more to limit sup-
ply, but that we focus our efforts to reduce demand.
(b) DECLARATION-It is the declared policy of the United States Govern-
ment to create a Drug-Free America by 1995.
Anti-Drug Abuse Act, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 5251, 102 Stat. 4309, 4309-10 (1988).
280. Id. § 5251, at 4310.
281. See Nelson, Bush Tells Plan to Combat Drugs, L.A. Times, Sept. 6, 1989, Part I,
at 1, col. 5. President Bush's strategy differs from prior Pre~idential proposals in that
it focuses on the casual drug user and provides for a coordinated attack by more than a
dozen federal agencies. Id. at 11, col. 1-2.
282. Id. at 1, col. 5; see also Hunt, President Proposes Crackdown at Home, Abroad,
L.A. Herald Examiner, Sept. 6, 1989, at Al, col. 6.
283. The Key Components, L.A. Herald Examiner, Sept. 6, 1989, at A8, col. 1. Fund-
ing will consist of $350 million for state and local governments for criminal justice and
law enforcement, and $1.2 billion for federal prison construction. Id. Funding will fur-
ther consist of $250 million to enlarge the capacity of the court system, $3.1 billion for
federal law enforcement, and $1.6 billion for corrections. Hunt, supra note 282, at A8,
col. 6. All tolled, the President's proposal in this area will result in an increase of $2.2
billion for drug-related federal spending. Raum, Where the Money Will Come From,
L.A. Herald Examiner, Sept. 6, 1989, at A8, col. 2.
284. These include increasing fines for misdemeanor state drug offenses, seizing
user's cars, suspending driving privileges, and serving prison terms in "military style
boot camps." Hunt, supra note 282, at A8, col. 6. The President also advocated the
ultimate punishment for drug kingpins-the death penalty. See Excerpts: For Drug
Kingpins, the Death Penalty, L.A. Times, Sept. 6, 1989, Part I, at 11, col. 3 [hereinafter
Excerpts: For Drug Kingpins].
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governments as well as the private sector.28 5
Internationally, President Bush has called for a five-year, two bil-
lion-dollar campaign to combat drug producers, traffickers, and
smugglers in the Andean region. 286 The President also is focusing on
the elimination of cocaine production through crop eradication. To
accomplish these goals, President Bush has pledged U.S. military
power to foreign governments to combat the powerful drug cartels
within their borders.28 7 To stop the flow of drugs to America, the
President has allocated one and one-half billion dollars to drug in-
terdiction, emphasizing greater use of drug-detection dogs, container
inspections, air interdiction, and other methods of interception.288
Given the magnitude of the national campaign and its stark empha-
sis on law enforcement and drug interdiction, judicial criticism will
be somewhat stifled. The judiciary will have difficulty rebuking gov-
ernment-sponsored drug testing as being in contravention to civil lib-
erties when billions of dollars are being spent to expand the criminal
justice system and to enforce the nation's drug laws. Popular pres-
sures backing the campaign also may sway judicial favor. Under this
onslaught, it is questionable whether the judiciary will emerge from
the war against drugs with the ability to judge drug-related issues
impartially.
Thus, one can anticipate that the initial reluctance exhibited by the
lower courts in extending random drug testing to different employ-
ment contexts will dissipate under this assault. If the popular mo-
mentum continues, Von Raab's compelling governmental interest
rationale will ultimately justify random drug testing in any working
environment because, in the eyes of the nation, what interest is more
compelling than saving America from the throes of addiction?
285. Hunt, supra note 282, at A8, col. 6.
286. Id. at A8, col. 1; see also Excerpts: For Drug Kingpins, supra note 284, at 11,
col. 3. About $250 million dollars will be provided to the nations of Peru, Bolivia, and
Columbia during 1989 to plan their attacks on drug suppliers. Highlights of the Bush
Plan, L.A. Times, Sept. 6, 1989, Part I, at 11, col. 1. This amount will increase to $449
million in 1990. Id.
287. The President was quoted as saying:
Our message to the drug cartels is this: The rules have changed. We will help
any government that wants our help. When requested, we will for the first
time make available the appropriate resources of America's armed forces. We
will intensify our efforts against drug smugglers on the high seas, in interna-
tional airspace and at our borders.
What the President Said, L.A. Herald Examiner, Sept. 6, 1989, at A8, col. 1 (emphasis
added).
288. Id.
VI. CONCLUSION
With the continuous bombardment of anti-drug propaganda from
the Presidential podium, the Von Raab decision approving suspi-
cionless drug testing hardly can be characterized as unexpected. The
intensity of the national mobilization to eradicate drugs, along with
the conservative makeup of the Supreme Court, has forecasted the
impending decision. With four Reagan appointees on the bench,28 9 it
is no wonder that many of that administration's goals have recently
been implemented, including mandatory drug testing in the federal
workplace. 290 As evidenced by the composition of the Court and the
somewhat slanted delivery of the majority opinion, a politically plia-
ble balancing test has been applied in determining the reasonability
of governmental drug testing.
Although somewhat anticipated by the political and national aura,
the resounding effects of the Von Raab decision should not be lightly
overlooked. The fourth amendment provides that all citizens have
the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.29 1 The
purpose behind amending the Constitution was to ensure that the
government has a strong, individualized justification for invading in-
dividual privacy rights. 292 However, the imposition of suspicionless
drug testing on the federal work force will violate the privacy rights
of millions of workers without constitutional ratification.2 93 The
human anatomy, once "draped in constitutional protection," 294 is now
nakedly exposed for institutional inspection. By permitting mass
governmental intrusions on human dignity and privacy interests
289. During his tenure as President, Ronald Reagan elevated Justice William H.
Rehnquist to the position of Chief Justice and appointed Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and
Kennedy to positions on the bench.
290. The Court also has delimited abortion rights, curbed affirmative action pro-
grams and restricted the scope of civil rights. See Kamen, Divisive Issues at Center
Stage as Court Term Ends, Wash. Post, July 5, 1989, § 1, at Al, col. 2-3. The Washing-
ton Post observed:
The 1988-89 term marked the actual beginning of the era of Chief Justice Wil-
liam H. Rehnquist, and the year that the 'Reagan revolution' finally reached
the high court. With four Reagan appointees joined by staunchly conservative
Justice Byron R. White, the court moved toward enacting many of the Reagan
administration's goals.
Id. at Al, col. 2.
291. U.S. CONST. amend IV; see, e.g., Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507,
1517 (D.N.J. 1986).
292. Capua, 643 F. Supp. at 1517.
293. See id. at 1513. Presently, the greatest impact will be felt by the four million
workers in the transportation industry. Kurtijian, supra note 140, at 1. Because of
public safety concerns, the federal government has ordered the commencement of
drug testing procedures in January 1991 for airline pilots, bus and truck drivers, and
other common carriers. Id.
294. Capua, 643 F. Supp. at 1513 (citing United States v. Afanador, 567 F.2d 1325
(5th Cir. 1978)).
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without individualized suspicion, the Court has embarked upon a
dangerous precedent of abrogating constitutional guarantees.
President Bush has characterized drugs as "the gravest domestic
threat facing our nation."295 Perhaps, he should also have character-
ized America's enthusiasm for the abolition of drugs as the gravest
domestic threat facing civil liberties. By sanctioning suspicionless
drug testing, the Court sacrifices one of the basic tenets of the Con-
stitution and a free society-"the right to be let alone."296
ALYSSA C. WESTOVER
295. Hunt, supra note 282, at Al, col. 6.
296. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).

